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Abstract
The situation, in which an enormous risk is insured by a number of insur-
ance companies, is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-called co-
insurance game, first introduced in Fragnelli and Marina (2004). In this paper
we show that a co-insurance game possesses several interesting properties that
allow to study the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and to construct
an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus.
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1 Introduction
In many practical situations the risks are too large to be insured by only one com-
pany, for example environmental pollution risk. As a result, several insurance com-
panies share the liability and premium. In such a risk sharing situation two im-
portant practical questions arise: which premium the insurance companies have to
charge and how should the companies split the risk and the premium keeping them-
selves as much competitive as possible and at the same time obtaining a fair division?
In Fragnelli and Marina [8] the problem is approached from a game theoretic point
of view through the construction of a cooperative game, the so-called co-insurance
game. In this paper we study the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and the
nucleolus of the co-insurance game subject to the premium value. If the premium is
∗The research of Theo Driessen, Ilya Katsev, and Anna Khmelnitskaya was supported by NWO
(The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) grant NL-RF 047.017.017. The research
of Ilya Katsev was also supported by RFBR (Russian Foundation for Basic Research) grant 09-
06-00155. The research was partially done during Anna Khmelnitskaya 2008 research stay at the
Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS, Tilburg University) whose hospitality
and support are highly appreciated as well.
†University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede,
The Netherlands, e-mail: t.s.h.driessen@ewi.utwente.nl
‡University of Eastern Piedmont, Department of Science and Advanced Technologies, Viale
T. Michel 11, 15121, Alessandria, Italy, e-mail: vito.fragnelli@mfn.unipmn.it
§SPb Institute for Economics and Mathematics Russian Academy of Sciences, 1 Tchaikovsky
St., 191187 St.Petersburg, Russia, e-mail: katsev@yandex.ru
¶SPb Institute for Economics and Mathematics Russian Academy of Sciences, 1 Tchaikovsky
St., 191187 St.Petersburg, Russia, e-mail: a.khmelnitskaya@math.utwente.nl
1
large enough, the core is empty. If the premium meets a critical upper bound, the
nonemptiness of the core, being a single allocation composed of player’s marginal
contributions, turns out to be equivalent to the so-called 1-convexity property of
the co-insurance game. Moreover, if nonemptiness applies, the co-insurance game
inherits the 1-convexity property while lowering the premium till a critical lower
bound induced by the individual evaluations of the enormous risk. In addition,
1-convexity of the co-insurance game yields the linearity of the nucleolus which, in
particular, appears to be a linear function of the variable premium. If 1-convexity
does not apply, then for the premium below another critical number we present an
efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus.
The interest to the class of co-insurance games is not only because they reflect
the well defined actual economic situations but also it is determined by the fact that
any arbitrary nonnegative monotonic cooperative game may be represented in the
form of a co-insurance game. This allows to glance into the nature of a nonnegative
monotonic game from another angle and by that to discover its new properties and
peculiarities. Further, a co-insurance game appears to be a very natural extension of
the well-known bankruptcy game introduced by Aumann and Maschler [2]. Besides,
the study of 1-convex/1-concave TU games possessing a nonempty core and for
which the nucleolus is linear was initiated by Driessen and Tijs [7] and Driessen
[5], but until recently appealing abstract and practical examples of these classes of
games were missing. The first practical example of a 1-concave game, the so-called
library cost game, and the 1-concave complementary unanimity basis for the entire
space of TU games were introduced in Driessen, Khmelnitskaya, and Sales [6]. A
co-insurance game under some conditions provides a new practical example of a 1-
convex game. Moreover, in this paper we also show that a bankruptcy game is not
only convex but 1-convex as well when the estate is sufficiently large comparatively
to the given claims.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Basic definitions and notation are given
in Sect. 2. Sect. 3 studies the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and the
nucleolus of a co-insurance game with respect to the premium value. In Sect. 4 an
algorithm for computing the nucleolus is introduced.
2 Preliminaries
Recall some definitions and notation. A cooperative game with transferable utility
(TU game) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players and
v : 2N → IR is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of N , satisfying
v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N (or S ∈ 2N ) of s players is called a coalition, and the
associated real number v(S) represents the worth of the coalition S; in particular,
N is call a grand coalition. The set of all games with a fixed player set N is denoted
by GN and it can be naturally identified with the Euclidean space IR
2n−1. For
simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write v instead of 〈N, v〉
when referring to a game. A value is an operator ξ : GN → IR
n that assigns to any
game v ∈ GN a vector ξ(v) ∈ IR
n; the real number ξi(v) represents the payoff to the
player i in the game v. A payoff vector x ∈ IRn is said to be efficient in the game
v, if x(N) = v(N). Given a game v, the subgame v|T with the player set T ⊆ N ,
T 6= ∅, is a game defined by v|T (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T . A game v is nonnegative
2
if v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N . A game v is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
For the cardinality of a given set A we use a standard notation |A| along with lower
case letters like n = |N |, m = |M |, nk = |Nk|, and so on. We also use standard
notation x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi and xS = {xi}i∈S , for all x ∈ IR
n, S ⊆ N .
The imputation set of a game v ∈ GN is defined as a set of efficient and individ-
ually rational payoff vectors
I(v) = {x ∈ IRn | x(N) = v(N), xi ≥ v(i), for all i ∈ N},
while the preimputation set of a game v ∈ GN is defined as a set of efficient payoff
vectors
I∗(v) = {x ∈ IRn | x(N) = v(N)}.
The core [9] of a game v ∈ GN is defined as a set of efficient payoff vectors that
are not dominated by any coalition, i.e.,
C(v) = {x ∈ IRn | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N}.
A game v ∈ GN is balanced if C(v) 6= ∅.
For any game v ∈ GN , the excess of a coalition S ⊆ N with respect to a vector
x ∈ IRn is given by
ev(S, x) = v(S)− x(S).
The nucleolus [12] is a value defined as a minimizer of the lexicographic ordering
of components of the excess vector of a given game v ∈ GN arranged in weakly
decreasing order of their magnitude over the imputation set I(v).
The prenucleolus is a value defined as a minimizer of the lexicographic ordering
of components of the excess vector of a given game v ∈ GN arranged in weakly
decreasing order of their magnitude over the preimputation set I∗(v).
For a game v ∈ GN with a nonempty core the nucleolus ν(v) belongs to C(v).
For a game v ∈ GN we consider the vector m
v ∈ IRn of marginal contributions
to the grand coalition, the so-called marginal worth vector, defined as
mvi = v(N)− v(N\{i}), for all i ∈ N,
and the gap vector gv ∈ IR2
N
defined as
gv(S) =
{ ∑
i∈Sm
v
i − v(S), S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅,
0, S = ∅,
i.e., the gap vector measures for every S ⊆ N the total coalitional surplus of marginal
contributions to the grand coalition over its worth. In fact, gv(S) = −ev(S,mv),
with ev(S,mv) being th excess vector of S in game v at payoff vector x = mv.
It is easy to check that in any game v ∈ GN , the vector m
v relates to the core
being an upper bound in that xi ≤ m
v
i , for any x ∈ C(v) and all i ∈ N . In particular,
the condition v(N) ≤
∑
i∈N m
v
i is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for
nonemptiness of the core of the arbitrary game v, i.e., a strictly negative gap of the
grand coalition gv(N) < 0 implies C(v) = ∅.
A game v ∈ GN is convex if for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i},
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ), (1)
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or equivalently, if for all S, T ⊆ N ,
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
Any convex game has a nonempty core [13].
Proposition 1 For every convex game v ∈ GN it holds that
gv(N) ≥ 0, and gv(N) ≥ gv(S), for all S ⊆ N.
Proof The inequality gv(N) ≥ 0 follows directly from the nonemptiness of the core
of any convex game.
Next notice that for any S ⊆ N ,
gv(N)− gv(S) =
∑
i∈N\S
[
v(N)− v(N\{i})
]
−
[
v(N)− v(S)
]
.
Denote elements of N\S by i1, i2, . . . in−s, i.e., N\S = {i1, i2, . . . in−s}. Then,
v(N)−v(S) =[
v(N)−v(N\{i1})
]
+
[
v(N\{i1})−v(N\{i1, i2})
]
+. . .+
[
v(S∪{in−s})−v(S)
]
.
Therefore, applying successively n − s times the inequality (1), we obtain that for
all S ⊆ N , gv(N)− gv(S) ≥ 0.
A game v ∈ GN is 1-convex if
0 ≤ gv(N) ≤ gv(S), for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅. (2)
As it is shown in Driessen and Tijs [7] and Driessen [5], every 1-convex game
has a nonempty core. In a 1-convex game v, for every efficient vector x ∈ IRn, the
inequalities xi ≤ m
v
i , for all i ∈ N , guarantee that x ∈ C(v). In particular, the
characterizing property of a 1-convex game is that the replacement of any single co-
ordinate mvi in the vector m
v by the amount of v(N)−mv(N\i) places the resultant
vector m¯v(i) = {m¯vj (i)}j∈N , given by
m¯vj (i) =
{
v(N)−mv(N\i) = mvi − g
v(N), j = i,
mvj , j 6= i,
for all j ∈ N,
into the core C(v). Moreover, in a 1-convex game the set of vectors {m¯v(i)}i∈N
creates a set of extreme points of the core which in turn coincides with their convex
hull, i.e., C(v) = co({m¯v(i)}i∈N ). Besides, the nucleolus ν(v) occupies the central
position in the core coinciding with the barycenter of the core vertices, and is given
by the formula
νi(v) = m
v
i −
gv(N)
n
, for all i ∈ N. (3)
So, the nucleolus coincides with the equal allocation of nonseparable contribution
the amount of gv(N) over the players, or in other terms, every player according
to nucleolus gets its marginal contribution to the grand coalition minus an equal
share in the gap gv(N) of the grand coalition. That presents a special advantage
of the class of 1-convex games because the nucleolus, defined as a solution to a
lexicographical optimization problem that in general is difficult to compute, for
1-convex games appears to be linear and thus simple to determine.
By definition of 1-convexity (2) and from Proposition 1 we easily obtain
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Proposition 2 A convex game v ∈ GN is 1-convex, if and only if
gv(N) = gv(S), for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅.
In the next section we study the so-called co-insurance game that appears to be
closely related to the well-known bankruptcy game. For a bankruptcy problem (E; d)
given by an estate E ∈ IR+ and a vector of claims d∈ IR
n
+ assuming that the total
claim of the creditors is greater than the remaining estate, i.e., d(N) =
∑
i∈N di > E,
the corresponding bankruptcy game vE;d ∈ GN is defined in Aumann and Maschler
[2] by
vE;d(S) = max{0, E − d(N\S)}, for all S ⊆ N. (4)
To conclude this section recall a few extra definitions that will be used below.
A set of coalitions B ⊂ 2N\{N} is called a set of balanced coalitions, if positive
numbers λS , S ∈ B exist such that∑
S∈B : S∋i
λS = 1, for all i ∈ N.
A player i is a veto-player in the game v ∈ GN , if v(S) = 0, for every S ⊆ N \ i.
A game v ∈ GN is a veto-rich game if it has at least one veto-player.
For a game v ∈ GN , a coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, and an efficient payoff vector
x ∈ IRn, the Davis-Maschler reduced game with respect to S and x is the game
vS,x∈GS defined in [3] by
vS,x(T ) =


0, T = ∅,
v(N)− x(N\S), T = S,
maxQ⊆N\S
(
v(T ∪Q)− x(Q)
)
, otherwise,
for all T ⊆ S.
3 Co-insurance game and its core
Consider the problem in which a risk is evaluated too much heavy for a single
insurance company, but it can be insured by the finite set N of companies that
share a given risk R and premium Π. First, it is assumed that every company i ∈ N
expresses the valuation of a random variable R through a real-valued nonnegative
functional Hi(R) such that Hi(0)=0, for all i∈N . For any nonempty subset S ⊆ N
of companies, let A(S) = {X ∈ IRS |
∑
i∈S Xi = R} represents the (non-empty) set
of feasible decompositions of the given risk R. Second, by hypothesis, it is supposed,
for every S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,, that an optimal decomposition of the risk exists, so that
minX∈A(S)
∑
i∈S Hi(Xi) := P(S) is well-defined. Here the real-valued set function
P can be seen as the evaluation of the optimal decomposition of the risk R by the
companies in coalition S as a whole.
To determine the evaluation function P may result in general not an easy task.
However, under some reasonable assumptions borrowed from real-life applications
it turns out that P can be easily computed for all coalitions. For instance, in case
of constant quotas, when it is supposed that for each insurable risk R, for every
S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, there exists the only one feasible decomposition
(
qi
q(S)R
)
i∈S
∈ IRS
specified by a priori given quotas qi>0, i∈N,
∑
i∈N qi=1, and moreover, for each
insurable riskR,
Hi(R) = qiH
(R
qi
)
, for all i ∈ N,
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where H is some a priori fixed convex function, the evaluation function P for every
S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, is given by
P(S) =
∑
i∈S
Hi
( qi
q(S)
R
)
= q(S)H
( R
q(S)
)
.
If insurance companies evaluate a risk R according to the variance principle, i.e.,
Hi(R) = E(R) + aiV ar(R), ai > 0, for all i ∈ N,
where E(R) and V ar(R) denote the expectation and variance of a random variable
R, then we are in case of constant quotas when the corresponding quotas may
be obtained as qi =
a(N)
ai
, where a(N) =
(∑
i∈N
1
ai
)−1
(cf. Deprez and Gerber
[4], Fragnelli and Marina [8]). Later on we do not discuss the construction of the
evaluation function P. The only important in what follows is that P is nonnegative
and non-increasing, i.e., for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ T ⊆ N , 0 ≤ P(T ) ≤ P(S).
For a given premium Π and an evaluation function P : 2N → IR, Fragnelli and
Marina [8] define the associated co-insurance game vΠ,P ∈ GN as following
vΠ,P(S) =
{
max{0,Π− P(S)}, S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅,
0, S = ∅.
(5)
By definition, the co-insurance game vΠ,P is nonnegative and since P is non-increasing
it easily follows that v is monotonic, i.e., for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N , 0 ≤ vΠ,P(S) ≤ vΠ,P(T ).
Notice that the well-known bankruptcy game (4) presents an example of the
co-insurance game (5). Indeed, if for each insurance company i ∈ N there exists
a fixed ”claim” di ≥ 0 such that P(S) =
∑
i∈N\S di, for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, then
the co-insurance game reduces to the bankruptcy game with the estate equal to
the premium Π. This particular evaluation function P is nonnegative and non-
increasing,P(N)=0.
In the framework of the co-insurance game, we consider the evaluation function
P being fixed, while the premium Π as a variable quantity varying from small up to
sufficiently large amounts. In order to avoid trivial situations, let the premium Π
be large enough so that Π > P(N). The following results are already proved in [8]:
• If the premium Π is small enough in that Π≤maxi∈N P(N\{i}), then the co-
insurance game vΠ,P is balanced since the core C(vΠ,P) contains the efficient
allocation ξ={ξi}i∈N , where ξi∗=vΠ,P(N) for some i
∗∈argmaxi∈N P(N\{i}),
and ξi=0 for all i 6= i
∗.
• If Π > α¯P =
∑
i∈N
[
P(N\{i})− P(N)
]
+ P(N), then C(vΠ,P) = ∅.
• For all Π ≤ α¯P , under the hypothesis of reduced concavity of function P:
P(S)−P(S ∪ {i}) ≥ P(N\{i})−P(N), for all S & N and every i ∈ N\S,
(6)
C(vΠ,P) 6= ∅.
To ensure strictly positive worth vΠ,P(S) > 0 for every coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
we suppose that the premium Π is strictly bounded from below by the critical
number αP = maxi∈N P({i}). For all Π ≥ αP , we have
m
vΠ,P
i = vΠ,P(N)− vΠ,P(N\{i}) = P(N\{i})− P(N), for all i ∈ N, (7)
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for any S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
gvΠ,P (S) =
∑
i∈S
m
vΠ,P
i − vΠ,P(S) =
∑
i∈S
[
P(N\{i})− P(N)
]
+ P(S)−Π. (8)
In what follows we distinguish the two cases α¯P ≥ αP and α¯P < αP .
Notice that in the bankruptcy setting, α¯P =
∑
i∈N di and αP =
∑
i∈N di−
mini∈N di, i.e., it always holds that αP ≤ α¯P .
First consider the case α¯P≥αP . It turns out that in this case the nonemptiness
of the core C(vΠ,P) for Π= α¯P is equivalent to 1-convexity of the co-insurance game
vα¯P ,P .
Theorem 1 Let α¯P ≥ αP , then the following equivalences hold:
(i) the co-insurance game vα¯P ,P is balanced;
(ii) the core C(vα¯P ,P) is a singleton and coincides with the marginal worth vector
mvα¯P ,P ;
(iii) the evaluation function P meets the so-called 1-concavity condition
P(S)− P(N) ≥
∑
i∈N\S
[
P(N\{i})− P(N)
]
, for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅; (9)
(iv) the co-insurance game vα¯P ,P is 1-convex.
Proof From (8) it follows that for all Π ≥ αP ,
α¯P =
∑
i∈N
[
P(N\{i})− P(N)
]
+ P(N) = gvΠ,P (N) + Π.
By hypothesis α¯P ≥ αP , therefore, applying the last equality to Π = α¯P , we obtain
that
gvα¯P ,P (N) = 0. (10)
Since for any game v ∈ GN , the marginal worth vector m
v provides upper bound for
the core, a game v with zero gap gv(N) = 0 can possess at most one core allocation
coinciding with mv, which is mvα¯P ,P in case of the co-insurance game vα¯P ,P . Next
notice that the 1-concavity condition (9) is equivalent to∑
i∈S
[
P(N\{i})−P(N)
]
≥
∑
i∈N
[
P(N\{i})−P(N)
]
+P(N)−P(S), for allS⊆N, S 6=∅,
(11)
which is the same as the marginal worth vector mvα¯P ,P satisfies the core constraints∑
i∈S
m
vα¯P ,P
i ≥ α¯P − P(S) = vα¯P ,P(S), for all S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
Whence it follows that the marginal worth vector mvα¯P ,P ∈ C(vα¯P ,P), if and only if
the evaluation function P satisfies the 1-concavity condition (9). Moreover, because
of (8), the inequality (11) is equivalent to
gvα¯P ,P (N) ≤ gvα¯P ,P (S), for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅,
which together with equality (10) is equivalent to 1-convexity of the co-insurance
game vα¯P,P .
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Remark 1 Notice that our 1-concavity condition (9) is weaker then the condition
of reduced concavity (6) used in [8].
Theorem 2 If for some fixed premium Π∗ ≥ αP , the co-insurance game vΠ∗,P is
1-convex, then for every premium Π, αP ≤ Π ≤ Π
∗, the corresponding co-insurance
game vΠ,P is 1-convex as well.
Proof For all Π ≥ αP , due to (8) it holds that for every S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, the
gap gvΠ,P (S) is a decreasing linear function of the variable Π, while the difference
gvΠ,P (S)− gvΠ,P (N) is constant for all Π. Whence, it follows that if for some fixed
premium Π∗ ≥ αP the co-insurance game vΠ∗,P is 1-convex, i.e., for all S ⊆ N ,
S 6= ∅, the inequality (2) holds, then this inequality remains valid for all premium
αP ≤ Π ≤ Π
∗, i.e., all games vΠ,P appear to be 1-convex as well.
The next theorem follows easily from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 Let α¯P ≥ αP . If the evaluation function P satisfies the 1-concavity
condition (9), then for any premium αP ≤ Π ≤ α¯P ,
(i) the corresponding co-insurance game vΠ,P is 1-convex;
(ii) the core C(vΠ,P) 6= ∅;
(iii) the nucleolus ν(vΠ,P) is the barycenter of the core C(vΠ,P) and is given by
νi(vΠ,P) = P(N\{i})− P(N) +
Π− α¯P
n
, for all i ∈ N. (12)
Proof The first statement follows directly from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Next,
recall already mentioned above results obtained in Driessen and Tijs [7] and Driessen
[5], stating that every 1-convex game has a nonempty core and its nucleolus being
the barycenter of the core is given by the formula (3). These facts, together with
(7) and (8), complete the proof.
In words, the third statement of Theorem 3 means that the nucleolus of these
co-insurance games is a linear function of the variable premium such that each incre-
mental premium is shared equally among the insurance companies. Geometrically,
the nucleoli payoffs follow a straight line to end up at the marginal worth vector
yielding payoff P(N\{i})− P(N) to player i ∈ N .
Remark 2 The statement of Theorem 3 remains in force if the 1-concavity con-
dition (9) for the evaluation function P is replaced by any one of the equivalent
conditions given by Theorem 1, in particular if C(vα¯P ,P) 6= ∅ or if the co-insurance
game vα¯P ,P is 1-convex.
Remark 3 Formula (12) for nucleolus of a co-insurance game can be derived alter-
natively using the method for computing the nucleolus of the so-called compromise
stable game introduced in Quant et al. [11]. Indeed, it is not difficult to check that
every 1-convex game appears to be compromise stable.
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Remark 4 In the bankruptcy setting Theorem 3 expresses the fact that the nu-
cleolus provides equal losses to all creditors (insurance companies) with respect to
their individual claims, if estate (premium) varies between
∑
i∈N di−mini∈N di and∑
i∈N di, which agrees well with the Talmud rule for bankruptcy situations studied
exhaustively in Aumann and Maschler [2].
Consider now the case α¯P < αP . In this case, even if the co-insurance game
vα¯P ,P is 1-convex, for the co-insurance game vΠ,P corresponding to the premium
Π < α¯P the 1-convexity may be lost immediately while lowering the premium. This
happens due to the fact that the co-insurance worth of at least one coalition turns
out to be at zero level. For instance, consider the following example.
Example 1 Let the evaluation function P for 3 insurance companies be given by
P({1}) = 5, P({2}) = 4, P({3}) = 3, P({1, 2}) = P({1, 3}) = P({2, 3}) = 2, and
P({1, 2, 3})=1. In this case, 4= α¯P < αP=5.
• If the premium Π = 4, then the co-insurance game v4,P :
v4,P({1})=v4,P({2})=0, v4,P({3})=1, v4,P({12})=v4,P({13})=v4,P({23})=
2, v4,P({123})=3,
is a 1-convex game with the minimal for a 1-convex game gap gv4,P ({123})=0
and, therefore, with the unique core allocation mv4,P =(1, 1, 1).
• If the premium Π = 3, then the co-insurance game v3,P :
v3,P({1})=v3,P({2})=v3,P({3})=0, v3,P({12})=v3,P({13})=v3,P({23})=1,
v3,P({123})=2,
is a symmetric 1-convex and convex, since the gap gv3,P (S)=1 is constant for
all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, while its core C(v3,P) is the triangle with three extreme
points (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1).
• For any premium 2 ≤ Π < 3, the corresponding co-insurance game vΠ,P is zero-
normalized and symmetric: vΠ,P(i)=0, vΠ,P(ij)=Π− 2, vΠ,P(123)=Π− 1.
However, the 1-convexity fails because the gap of singletons is strictly less than
the gap of N : gvΠ,P (i)=1 < 4−Π=gvΠ,P (123).
4 Algorithms for computing nucleolus
It is easy to compute the nucleolus of a co-insurance game when it is a linear
function of a given premium as it is stated by Theorem 3. In this section we
introduce a comparatively simple algorithm that allows to compute the nucleolus of
a co-insurance game also in cases when it is nonlinear in the premium. To do that,
we uncover first the relation between the class of co-insurance games, in particular
bankruptcy games, and the class Davis-Maschler reduced games of monotonic veto-
rich games obtained by deleting a veto-player with respect to the nucleolus. Second,
we provide an algorithm for computing the nucleolus for games of the latter class.
In what follows by GmN we denote the class of all monotonic games with a player
set N . Let N0 := N ∪ {0} and n0 = n + 1. Consider the class G
m
N0
of monotonic
veto-rich games with a player set N0 and the player 0 being a veto-player. Besides,
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we consider the class G+N0 of nonnegative veto-rich games with a player set N0 and
the player 0 being a veto-player, that satisfies also the property v0(N0) ≥ v
0(S), for
all S ⊆ N0. It is easy to see that G
m
N0
⊂ G+N0 . Define RN as a class of veto-removed
games v ∈ GN that are the Davis-Maschler reduced games of games v
0 ∈ GmN0
obtained by deleting the veto-player 0 in accordance to the nucleolus payoff. As
it was already shown in Arin and Feltkamp [1], for every veto-rich game from the
class G+N0 the core is nonempty and the nucleolus payoff to a veto-player is larger
than or equal to that of the other players. From where it easily follows that every
veto-removed game is balanced because the Davis-Maschler reduced game inherits
the core property and, moreover, in every nontrivial veto-rich game v0 ∈ G+N0 the
nucleolus payoff to a veto-player ν0(v
0) > 0 since in any nontrivial game v0 ∈ G+N0
the worth of the grand coalition v0(N0) > 0.
Some extra notation. With every game v∈G+N we associate the following veto-
rich game v0∈G+N0 defined as
v0(S) =
{
0, S 6∋ 0,
v(S\{0}), S ∋ 0,
for all S ⊆ N0. (13)
For every veto-rich game v0 ∈ G+N0 let ν0 denote the nucleolus payoff ν0(v
0) to the
veto-player 0 in v0. Besides, for a game v ∈ GN and a ∈ IR+ we define the game
v−a∈GN as follows
v−a(S) = max{0, v(S)− a}, for all S ⊆ N. (14)
Below for the facilitation of reading for any set of players M containing the veto-
player 0, any coalition S0⊆M with subindex 0 is assumed to contain the veto-player
0, and it is supposed that for any S0 ⊆M holds the equality s0= |S0|=s+1, where
s= |S0 ∩M\{0}|. Furthermore, for any game w ∈ GM , for every S $ M we define
a number
κw(S) =


w(M)−w(S)
m−s+1 , S 6= ∅,
w(M)
m
, S = ∅.
(15)
For M 6∋0, we define also a number κ∗(w)= min
S$M
κw(S), and for M ∋0, we define a
number κ∗0(w)= min
S0$M
κw(S0).
Theorem 4 It holds that
(i) every game v ∈ RN can be presented in the form of a co-insurance game
vΠ,P ∈GN ;
(ii) if vΠ∗,P ∈ RN , then for every premium Π ≤ Π
∗, vΠ,P ∈ RN as well;
(iii) for every evaluation functionP : 2N→ IR, for every premium Π,
Π ≤ Π∗ = P(N) + nmin
S$N
P(S)− P(N)
n− s+ 1
, (16)
the co-insurance game vΠ,P ∈RN .
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Proof (i). Consider v ∈ RN . By definition of RN there exists v
0 ∈ GmN0 such that
v is the Davis-Maschler reduced game derived from v0 by deleting the veto-player 0
with respect to the nucleolus. By definition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game it
holds
v(S)=


0, S = ∅,
v0(N ∪ {0})− ν0, S = N,
max{v0(S), v0(S ∪ {0})−ν0}=max{0, v
0(S ∪ {0})−ν0}, S$N,S 6=∅.
Take some positive k > v
0(N∪{0})
ν0
− 1 and set
Π = kν0,
P(S) = (k + 1)ν0 − v
0(S ∪ {0}), for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅.
Whence
v(S) = max{0,Π− P(S)}, for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅.
(ii). Recall first that every co-insurance game is monotonic and, moreover, for
any co-insurance game vΠ,P , for any a ∈ IR+, the game v
−a
Π,P is also a co-insurance
game with the premium equal to Π− a, i.e, v−aΠ,P = vΠ−a,P . Therefore in view of (i)
proved above, for proving (ii) it is sufficient to show that if for certain game v ∈ GmN
it holds that v−a ∈ RN for some a ∈ IR+, then v
−b ∈ RN for all b ∈ IR+, a < b.
Moreover, notice that it is enough to prove that v−b ∈ RN only for a < b ≤ v(N)
since due to (14), it holds v−b ≡ 0 ∈ RN for all b ≥ v(N).
Consider now a game v ∈ GmN together with its associated veto-rich game v
0 ∈
GmN0 . From (13) and already mentioned above statement of Arin and Feltkamp [1]
concerning the nucleolus payoff to a veto-player, it follows easily that v(N)
n+1 ≤ ν0 ≤
v(N). Set a := ν0. It is not difficult to see that v
−a ∈ GN is the Davis-Maschler
reduced game of the game v0 obtained by deleting the veto-player 0 with respect to
the nucleolus payoff a. So, by definition of RN , v
−a ∈ RN . Recall that if a = v(N),
v−a ≡ 0 ∈ RN .
Next, we show that if a < v(N), then for all b, a ≤ b ≤ v(N), also v−b ∈ RN .
The above procedure of constructing a veto-removed game may be applied to any
monotonic game, in particular to the just obtained monotonic game v−a ∈ RN .
Doing that, we get another monotonic game, say v−a
1
∈ RN , with a
1 = a+ν0(v
−a) >
a when a < v(N). We show first that v−b ∈ RN for all a ≤ b ≤ a
1. Consider
0 ≤ c ≤ a and apply the above procedure for all monotonic games v−c ∈ GN . For
c = 0 we start with v and obtain the monotonic game v−a ∈ RN . For c = a we
start with v−a and obtain the monotonic game v−a
1
∈ RN . Due to the continuity
of the nucleolus we obtain all v−b while c varies between 0 and a. Hence v−b ∈ RN
for all a ≤ b ≤ a1.
When a1 < v(N) then applying the above procedure to the game v−a
1
we obtain
a game v−a
2
∈ RN with a
2 > a1 and so on. Since on each step k, ak − ak−1 =
ν0(v
−ak−1) ≥ v(N)−a
k−1
n+1 , any number a≤b≤v(N) can be reached by not more than
b−a
v(N)−b(n+ 1) steps. Therefore, for every b, a ≤ b ≤ v(N), v
−b ∈ RN .
(iii). Take a co-insurance game vΠ,P with Π ≥ αP , for simplicity of notation
denote vΠ,P by v, and consider the corresponding veto-rich game v
0 ∈ GmN0 defined
by (13). As it is shown in the proof of (ii), the Davis-Maschler reduced game of
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the game v0 obtained by deleting the veto-player 0 with respect to the nucleolus
coincides with the game v−a, a = ν0, which in turn coincides with the co-insurance
game vΠ′,P with Π
′ = Π − ν0. Hence, vΠ′,P ∈ RN . From Proposition 3 below and
the definition of a co-insurance game (5), since Π ≥ αP , it follows that
ν0 ≤ Π− P(N)− nmin
S$N
P(S)− P(N)
n− s+ 1
,
i.e.,
Π′ ≥ P(N) + nmin
S$N
P(S)− P(N)
n− s+ 1
.
Then the validity of (iii) follows immediately from the just proved (ii).
Notice that (16) provides rather rough estimation of Π∗. In fact, in the particular
case of bankruptcy games, (16) guarantees that vE;d ∈ RN only when E ≤ 0. Next
theorem imposes weaker conditions on the parameters of a bankruptcy game vE;d
to guarantee that vE;d ∈ RN .
Theorem 5 For any estate E ∈ IR+ and any vector of claims d ∈ IR
n
+ such that
E ≤
∑n
i=1 di
2
,
the corresponding bankruptcy game vE;d ∈ RN .
Proof First take a bankruptcy game vE;d with E =
∑
i∈N di and let v be its co-
insurance game representation, i.e., v = vΠ,P with Π = d(N) and P(S) = d(N\S).
For a co-insurance game v consider the corresponding veto-rich game v0 defined by
(13),
v0(S) =


0, S 6∋ 0,∑
i∈S\{0}
di, S ∋ 0, for all S ⊆ N0.
We compute now the nucleolus payoff ν0 to the veto player 0 in v
0 applying Al-
gorithm 2 yielding nucleolus for monotonic veto-rich games with a veto-player 0
introduced below. Without loss of generality we assume that d1 ≤ d2 ≤ . . . ≤ dn.
Moreover, for every k=1, . . . , n we define a veto-rich game vk on N0\{1, . . . , k} as
follows
vk(S) =


0, S 6∋ 0,
∑
i∈S\{0}
di +
k∑
i=1
di
2 , S ∋ 0,
for all S ⊆ N0.
For any coalition S0 $ N0 it holds that
κv0(S0) =
v0(N0)− v
0(S0)
n− s+ 1
=
d(N0\S0)
n− s+ 1
≥
d1(n− s)
n− s+ 1
≥
d1
2
= κv0(N0\{1}).
Whence it follows that κ∗0(v
0) = κv0(N0\{1}), and therefore, Step 1 of Algorithm 2
assigns the nucleolus payoff ν1(v
0) = d12 to the player 1. Moreover, the Davis-
Maschler reduced game constructed in Step 1 is defined on the player set N0\{1}
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and coincides with the game v1. Using the similar reasoning it is not difficult to see
that for any k = 2, . . . , n, Algorithm 2 applied to the veto-rich game vk−1 defined
on the player set N0\{1, . . . , k − 1} assigns the nucleolus payoff
dk
2 to the player k
and goes to the next step with the Davis-Maschler reduced game coinciding with
the game vk defined on the player set N0\{1, . . . , k}. Then applying the induction
argument we obtain that νi(v
0) = di2 for all i ∈ N and ν0 = ν0(v
0) = d(N)2 .
Next observe that if a co-insurance game vΠ,P represents a bankruptcy game
vE;d, then for any a ∈ IR+, the co-insurance game v
−a
Π,P represents the bankruptcy
game vE−a;d. Hence, we may complete the proof following the same arguments as
in the proof of the statement (ii) of Theorem 4.
Consider now the following algorithm for constructing a payoff vector, say x ∈
IRN , in a game v ∈ RN .
Algorithm 1
0. Set M = N and w = v.
1. Find a coalition S $ M with minimal size such that κw(S) = κ∗(w).
2. For i ∈M\S, set xi = κw(S). If S = ∅, then stop, otherwise go to Step 3.
3. Construct the Davis-Maschler reduced game wS,x ∈ GS. Set M = S and
w = wS,x and return to Step 1.
Theorem 6 For any veto-removed game v ∈ RN , Algorithm 1 yields the nucleolus
payoff, i.e., x = ν(v).
The proof of Theorem 6 is obtained by comparing the outputs of two algorithms
yielding nucleoli – Algorithm 1 applied to a veto-removed game v ∈ RN and an-
other Algorithm 2, applied to the associated monotonic veto-rich game v0 ∈ GmN0 .
Algorithm 2 is closed conceptually to the algorithm for computing the nucleolus for
veto-rich games suggested in Arin and Feltkamp [1]. It is worth noting that for
the application of Algorithm 1 to a veto-removed game v ∈ RN there is no need
in construction of the associated monotonic veto-rich game v0 ∈ GmN0 which is only
necessary for proving Theorem 6. The proof of Theorem 6 is given after the proof
of Theorem 7.
The following Algorithm 2 constructs a payoff vector, say y ∈ IRN0 , in a game
v0 ∈ G+N0 . Since G
m
N0
⊂ G+N0 , Algorithm 2 is applicable to any game v
0 ∈ GmN0 as well.
Algorithm 2
0. Set M = N0 and w = v
0.
1. Find a coalition S0 $ M with minimal size such that κw(S0) = κ∗0(w).
2. For i ∈ M\S0, set yi = κw(S0). If S0 = {0}, set y0 = v
0(N0) −
∑
i∈N
yi and
stop, otherwise go to Step 3.
3. Construct the Davis-Maschler reduced game wS0,y ∈ GS0. Set M = S0 and
w = wS0,y and return to Step 1.
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Theorem 7 For any veto-rich game v0 ∈ G+N0, Algorithm 2 yields the nucleolus
payoff, i.e., y = ν(v0).
Proof Let v0 ∈ G+N0 . For the simplification of notation denote the nucleolus
ν(v0) by x, x ∈ IRn+1, and let e∗(v0) denote the maximal excess with respect to
the nucleolus in the game v0, i.e., e∗(v0) = max
S$N0
ev
0
(S, x). As a corollary to the
Kohlberg’s characterization of the prenucleolus [10] it holds that the collection of
coalitions with maximal excess values with respect to the nucleolus is balanced. Due
to the balancedness, among the coalitions having the maximal excess there exists
S0 $ N0. We show that every singleton {i}, i /∈ S0, also has the maximal excess.
Let i /∈ S0. Again due to the balancedness, there exists S ⊂ N0, S ∋ i, S 6∋ 0, with
maximal excess. Observe that since S 6∋ 0, then by definition of a veto-rich game
v0(S) = v0(S\{i}) = v0({i}) = 0. If |S| > 1 then
e(S, x) = v0(S)− x(S) = −x(S) = −x({i})− x(S\{i}) = e({i}, x) + e(S\{i}, x).
Since the core of every veto-rich game in GN0+ is nonempty, the nucleolus belongs to
the core and all excesses with respect to the nucleolus are nonpositive, in particular,
e(S\{i}, x) ≤ 0. From where it follows that e({i}, x) ≥ e(S, x), i.e., every singleton
{i}, i /∈ S, possesses the maximal excess as well.
For every S0 $ N0 with maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus from the
efficiency of the nucleolus and the equality v0({i}) = 0 for all i∈N0\S0, it follows
that
v0(S0)−v
0(N0) = v
0(S0)−x(N0) = v
0(S0)−x(S0)−
∑
i∈N0\S0
x(i) =
= ev
0
(S0, x)+
∑
i∈N0\S0
ev
0
({i}, x) = e∗(v0)·(n0−s0+1) = e
∗(v0)·(n−s+1).
Moreover, for every T0 $ N0 it holds that
v0(T0)−v
0(N0)=e
v0(T0, x) +
∑
i∈N0\T0
ev
0
({i}, x)≤e∗(v0) · (n− t+ 1).
Whence, for every T0 $ N0
κ
v0
(T0)
(15)
= −
v0(T0)− v
0(N0)
n0 − t0 + 1
≥ −e∗(v0), (17)
while for S0 $ N0 with maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus holds the
equality κ
v0
(S0) = −e
∗(v0). Then it follows that S0 $ N0 has the maximal excess
with respect to the nucleolus if and only if κ
v0
(S0) = κ
∗
0(v
0).
Therefore, on the first iteration of Algorithm 2 whenM = N0 and w = v
0, Step 1
provides a coalition S0 $ N0 with maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus.
Then Step 2 assigns to every i ∈ N0\S0 its nucleolus payoff because the assigned
payoff yi = κ
v0
(S0) coincides with xi = νi(v
0) since
yi = κ
v0
(S0) = −e
∗(v0) = −(v0({i})− xi) = xi, for all i ∈ N0\S0.
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In every veto-rich game from the class G+M with M containing the veto-player 0
the nucleolus coincides with the prenucleolus due to the nonemptiness of the core
which was already mentioned above with reference to [1]. Then, because of the
Davis-Maschler consistency of the prenucleolus [14], the nucleolus payoffs to the
players in the Davis-Maschler reduced game wS0,y ∈ GS0 constructed in Step 3 of
Algorithm 2 are the same as the nucleolus payoffs to the players in S0 in the game
w ∈ G+M . Thus in order to complete the proof, it only remains to show that the
Davis-Maschler reduced game wS0,y ∈ GS0 of a game w ∈ G
M
+ with M containing
the veto-player 0 is itself a veto-rich game belonging to G+S0 .
Take T ⊆ S0\{0}. Then
wS0,y(T ) = max
Q⊆M\S0
(w(T ∪Q)− y(Q)) = max
Q⊆M\S0
{0− y(Q)} = 0,
because w(T ∪Q) = 0 for every w ∈ G+M , since T ∪Q ⊆M\{0} for every Q ⊆M\S0.
Thus, 0 is a veto-player in wS0,y ∈ GS0 as well. Further, it is evident that wS0,y
is nonnegative. Hence, it remains to show that wS0,y(S0) ≥ wS0,y(T ) for every
T ⊆ S0. When T ⊆ S0\{0}, wS0,y(T ) = 0 ≤ wS0,y(S). Consider now T0 ⊆ S0 and
let Q ⊆M\S0. Since T0 ∩Q = ∅,
κw(T0 ∪Q) =
w(M)− w(T0 ∪Q)
m− |T0 ∪Q|+ 1
=
w(M)− w(T0 ∪Q)
m− t0 − q + 1
.
Moreover, T0 ∪ Q ⊆ M and T0 ∪ Q ∋ 0. By Step 1 of Algorithm 2, κw(S0) is the
minimal among all coalitions in M containing the veto-player 0. From where and
also because of the obvious inequality s0>t0−1, it holds that
w(M)− w(T0 ∪Q)
m− s0 − q
>
w(M)− w(T0 ∪Q)
m− t0 − q + 1
≥ κw(S0).
Hence,
w(M)− (m− s0) · κw(S0) > w(T0 ∪Q)− q · κw(S0),
and therefore, since at Step 2 every player’s i ∈ M\S0 payoff yi = κw(S0), it holds
that
w(M)− y(M\S0) > w(T0 ∪Q)− y(Q).
Then by definition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game we obtain wS0,y(S0) ≥
wS0,y(T0) for every T0 ⊆ S0.
From the proof of Theorem 7 also the upper bound for the nucleolus payoff ν0
to the veto-player 0 in a veto-rich game v0∈ G+N0 easily follows.
Proposition 3 For any veto-rich game v0∈ G+N0
ν0 ≤ v
0(N0)− n · κ
∗
0(v
0), (18)
with the equality, if and only if νi(v
0)=νj(v
0) holds for all i, j ∈ N .
Proof Since v0(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N , every excess of a singleton coalition {i}, i 6= 0,
with respect to the nucleolus ν(v0) is equal to −νi(v
0). From (17) in the proof of
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Theorem 7 it follows that the maximal excess in v0 with respect to the nucleolus is
equal to −κ∗0(v
0). Therefore from the efficiency of the nucleolus we obtain that
ν0 = v
0(N0)−
∑
i∈N
νi(v
0) = v0(N0) +
∑
i∈N
(−νi(v
0)) ≤ v0(N0) + n · (−κ
∗
0(v
0)),
where the equality hold, if and only if νi(v
0) = κ∗0(v
0) for all i, j ∈ N .
Remark 5 The inequality (18) can be equivalently presented in the form
κ∗0(v
0) ≤
v0(N0)− ν0
n
, (19)
with the equality, if and only if νi(v
0) = νj(v
0) holds for all i, j ∈ N . Inequality
(19) will be used later in the proof of Theorem 6.
We are ready now to prove Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6 Consider a veto-removed game v ∈ RN . By definition of RN
there exists a monotonic veto-rich game v0 ∈ GmN0 such that v is the Davis-Maschler
reduced game of v0 obtained by deleting the veto-player 0 in accordance to the
nucleolus payoff. Then because of the already mentioned above the Davis-Maschler
consistency of the nucleolus in a veto-rich game in GmN0 , νi(v) = νi(v
0) for all i ∈ N .
Since Algorithm 2 yields ν(v0), for proving Theorem 6 it is sufficient to show that
the payoff vector x produced by Algorithm 1 for the game v coincides on N with
the payoff vector y produced by Algorithm 2 for the game v0. For giving evidence
for that we show first that either in Step 1 of Algorithm 1 S = ∅ is chosen and the
algorithm yields the nucleolus, or it holds that
κ∗(v) = κ∗0(v
0). (20)
From Theorem 7, y = ν(v0). v is the Davis-Maschler reduced game of v0 ob-
tained by deleting the veto-player 0 in accordance to the nucleolus ν(v0). Hence by
definition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game, v(S) = max{0, v0(S ∪ {0}) − y0},
i.e., either v(S) = v0(S ∪ {0})− y0 or v(S) = 0. Let S $ N be the coalition chosen
in Step 1 at the first iteration of Algorithm 1. It turns out that either S = ∅, or
v(S) = v0(S ∪ {0})− y0. Indeed if we assume that S 6= ∅ and v(S) = 0, then
κv(S)
def
=
v(N)− v(S)
n− s+ 1
=
v(N)
n− s+ 1
≥
v(N)
n
def
= κv(∅),
i.e., κv(∅) ≤ κv(S) while |∅| = 0 < s, which contradicts the choice of S.
Let now S0 $ N0 be the coalition chosen in Step 1 at the first iteration of
Algorithm 2 and let S=S0\{0}. Similarly to the paragraph above, it turns out that
either S= ∅, or v(S)= v0(S ∪ {0}) − y0. Indeed if S 6= ∅ and v(S)=max{0, v
0(S ∪
{0})− y0}=0, i.e., v
0(S ∪ {0})− y0 < 0, then
κ
v0
(S0)
def
=
v0(N0)− v
0(S0)
n0 − s0 + 1
>
v0(N0)− y0
n− s+ 1
≥
v0(N0)− y0
n
,
which contradicts Proposition 3 restated in the form (19). Thus, for the coalition
S0 chosen in Step 1 at the first iteration of Algorithm 2 it holds that either S =
S0\{0} = ∅, or v(S) = v
0(S ∪ {0})− y0.
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Hence, due to the Davis-Maschler reduced game relationship between v and v0,
in both algorithms for all S $ N with the assumption that S=S0\{0} for S0 chosen
in Step 1 of Algorithm 2, it holds that either S = ∅ or v(S) = v0(S ∪ {0}) − y0.
Thus, for proving (20) it is sufficient to prove that for all S $ N it holds that
κv(S)=κ
v0
(S ∪ {0}).
First consider the case S $ N , S 6= ∅. Then v0(S0) = v(S)+y0, and in particular,
v0(N0) = v(N) + y0. Therefore,
κ
v0
(S0)
def
=
v0(N0)− v
0(S0)
n0 − s0 + 1
=
v(N)− v(S)
n− s+ 1
def
= κv(S),
i.e.,
κ
v0
(S0) = κv(S), for all S $ N, S 6= ∅. (21)
Consider now the case S = ∅. Then S0 = S ∪ {0} = {0} and
κ
v0
(S0) = κ
v0
({0})
def
=
v0(N0)− v
0({0})
n0
.
Again there are two options possible, namely κ
v0
({0}) = κ∗0(v
0) or κ
v0
({0}) >
κ∗0(v
0).
If κ
v0
({0}) = κ∗0(v
0), then Algorithm 2 terminates at the first iteration and in
Step 2 every player i ∈ N gets the same payoff yi=κ
v0
({0}). Due to the coincidence
of nucleoli in games v and v0 on N , it holds that every player i ∈ N in v has the
same nucleolus payoff that by efficiency is equal to
v(N)
n
. Hence, with i ∈ N ,
κ
v0
({0}) = yi
eff
=
v(N)
n
def
= κv(∅).
From where together with (21) it follows that (20) holds true when κ
v0
({0}) =
κ∗0(v
0).
If κ
v0
({0})>κ∗0(v
0), then there exists S$N , S 6=∅, such that κ
v0
(S0)=κ
∗
0(v
0).
Because of (21), κ
v0
(S0)=κv(S), and hence,
κv(S) = κ
∗
0(v
0)
(19)
≤
v0(N0)− y0
n
=
v(N)
n
def
= κv(∅),
where the second equality is due to v being the Davis-Maschler reduced game of v0.
Whence, either κv(∅)=κv(S), or κv(∅)>κv(S).
If κv(∅)=κv(S), then
κ∗0(v
0) =
v0(N0)− y0
n
,
and from Proposition 3 and Remark 5 it follows that νi(v
0)=νj(v
0) for all i, j∈N ,
and therefore, for all i ∈ N ,
νi(v
0)
D−M concist
= νi(v)
eff
=
v(N)
n
def
= κv(∅),
i.e., in Step 1 of Algorithm 1 the empty set is chosen and Algorithm 1 in fact yields
the nucleolus.
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If κv(∅) > κv(S), then there exists S
′ $ N , S′ 6= ∅, such that κv(S′) = κ∗(v)
(possibly, S′ = S). Hence, due to (21), for S′0 = S
′ ∪ {0} $ N0, κv(S′) = κ
v0
(S′0),
i.e., in this case κ∗(v) = κ∗0(v
0) as well. Thus, it is proved that either in Step 1
of Algorithm 1 either S = ∅ is chosen and the algorithm yields the nucleolus, or
κ∗(v) = κ∗0(v
0).
For completing the proof it remains to consider the situation when in Step 1 of
Algorithm 1 a coalition S $ N , S 6= ∅, is chosen. As it is shown above in such a
case in Step 1 of Algorithm 2 we always can chose S0$N0, S0=S ∪ {0}, for which
κ
v0
(S0)=κv(S). Thus, at the first iteration both algorithms at Step 2 assign xi=yi
for every i ∈ N\S = N0\S0. It is easy to see that the Davis-Maschler reduced game
wS,x constructed in Step 3 of Algorithm 1 is the Davis-Maschler reduced game of
the Davis-Maschler reduced game wS0,y constructed in Step 3 of Algorithm 2. Then
observe that the situation at all next iterations of both algorithms remains the same.
Therefore, repeating the same reasoning as above we obtain that both algorithms
assign the same payoffs to all players in N .
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